AJ Pasciuti - Marine Scout Sniper on Hunting Juba, the Deadliest Enemy Sniper in Iraq | SRS #305

Pasciuti recounts a deeply personal story from his 2006 deployment in Amaria, Iraq. As a 21-year-old sniper, he observed two men digging by the side of a road near an IED-riddled intersection, shortly after two Marines from his unit were killed by an IED. Convinced they were planting another device, and with clearance under the rules of engagement, he shot and killed both men. The next morning, he realized they were simply building a cinder block wall for their family. This incident, which he had never publicly shared before, highlights the profound moral injury and lifelong regret that can result from combat decisions made under pressure and imperfect information, especially when the broader strategic objectives of the war are unclear.

Pasciuti describes the incident in Amaria, Iraq, where he killed two men he believed were planting an IED, only to discover they were building a wall. He states, 'I killed two men that didn't deserve it.'

Pasciuti challenges conventional notions of masculinity, emphasizing that empathy, compassion, and understanding are not weaknesses but fundamental truths. He frames his book, 'Dark Horse,' as a 'love letter' to those who shaped his life, advocating for a masculinity that involves achieving personal success and then actively creating better opportunities for those who follow. He believes that showing vulnerability and sharing difficult experiences, like his combat story, demonstrates true strength and can help others struggling with self-efficacy or the aftermath of service.

Pasciuti states, 'To me, masculinity is... empathy and compassion and understanding are not weaknesses. They are truths.' He explains his book is a 'call to action' to 'make sure that the person behind you has a better opportunity at success.'

Pasciuti expresses strong reservations about the deployment of the U.S. military, particularly when politicians and policymakers impose rules of engagement that hinder proactive action, effectively turning infantry into reactive law enforcement officers. He argues that sending service members to war without 'tangible objectives' or 'damn good reasons' violates the 'social contract' between the country and its troops. He questions the overall justification of the Iraq War, reflecting on whether the sacrifices were worth the cost given the outcome 20 years later.

Pasciuti states, 'When politicians and policy makers get in the way of that one thing, they are endangering the lives of the service members they send forward themselves.' He questions, '20 years later... were we better off than we were in 2001? No.'

During AJ Pasciuti's Marine Corps boot camp, drill instructors directed a scribe to collect debit card PINs from all recruits. On graduation morning, military police arrested two Marines who were found with thousands of dollars stolen from fellow recruits' accounts, leaving many, including Pasciuti, a thousand dollars short and feeling betrayed on what should have been their proudest day.

All the drill instructors at one point had us we had to keep our pocket items... our scribe was directed to go down to all the recruits and ask for their PIN numbers to their debit card... on graduation morning... a recruit... dumps his seabag out and out of the seabag comes hundreds of stacks of $20... they were stealing $1,000 or so from every single recruit.

The quality of training at the School of Infantry (SOI) was significantly subpar during Pasciuti's time. Instructors were often temporary assignments ('FAPS') with limited experience, nearing the end of their contracts, and lacked the professionalism of drill instructors. This resulted in an 'assembly line' approach to training, with large classes and disengaged instructors, leading to poor educational outcomes.

The school of infantry at the time wasn't a formal billet... a lot of these guys are like 6 months left in the Marine Corps... they were not there's like they're also seen as less than drill instructors... the quality of training that I got at the school of infantry was very very very different... it was just an assembly line.

Pasciuti, an infantryman, challenges the Marine Corps' motto 'every Marine's a rifleman.' While acknowledging superior marksmanship training, he argues that it dilutes the specialized training and expertise required for actual infantry roles, making it feel as though his specific job title is undermined by the broader, less specialized claim.

We say every Marine's a rifleman... as an infantry guy... I have consternation with that term... my actual job title was rifleman and then the their moniker was like every Marine rifleman, it was like, well, then what am I in this whole thing?

The period between Vietnam and 9/11 created a vacuum of combat experience within the US military. Instructors training new recruits for war often had no direct combat experience themselves, leading to a 'tough guy' facade and a less professional training environment, which Pasciuti contrasts with later improvements in military professionalism.

It left a vacuum of experience... the military was very inexperienced at that time... they're kind of playing tough guy... they handled it much differently than my instructors did. There was a level of professionalism.

Days before the 2003 Iraq invasion, General Conway delivered a highly motivating speech to approximately 7,000 Marines from atop an M1A1 Abrams tank in Kuwait. He dramatically coordinated flyovers of Marine aviation and fixed-wing aircraft (CH-46s, CH-53s, Cobras, Hueys, F-18s, Harriers) to coincide with his words, creating an electrifying atmosphere that unified and energized the troops for the impending conflict.

General Conway who stood up on an M1 A1 Abrams tank... he had like the fifth Marine regiment... 7,000ish people... 'Over your left shoulder, you're going to have Marine aviation.' and he checks his watch and then all of a sudden CH46s, CH53s... flying over... 'And then you're gonna have fix wing.' And these [expletive] do like this like sonic boom F-18s and Harriers like and they like and and the and 7,000 Marines are like [cheering].

Pasciuti and the host discuss the belief that the Iraq War was based on flawed intelligence regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). The host reveals that Delta Force teams, including Pete Blaber's, had verified imagery indicating no WMDs (a missile was a water truck, an air purification system was an AC unit, a guard was taking a piss), but this information was ignored. This led to Pasciuti feeling 'lied to' and questioning the ultimate purpose and cost of the war.

Why do you think you'd never release the uh weapons of mass destruction? ... I don't think he had them... we very heavily acted on single source reporting... Pete Blabber and his guys... The missile was a water truck... Sent it back to him, they [expletive] ignored it. We went in... I can't help but feel pretty lied to.

Pasciuti expresses strong reservations about the prospect of a new open war with Iran, fearing it would repeat the mistakes of the Iraq War, which he describes as 'playing the same hits.' He argues that US military dominance should be a sufficient deterrent, advocating for peace, sanctions, or special operations over large-scale conventional conflict. He criticizes political leaders for not understanding the true human cost of war and for sending predominantly lower socioeconomic classes to fight.

I think that we have taken the playbook off of the shelf from 2003, blown the dust off of it, and are playing the same hits... I don't think that we should be at war with Iran and an open war with Iran... I wish that some of our political leaders understood this cost... It always comes from the same class of people. Predominantly... lower socioeconomic status people.

Pasciuti uses the analogy of a dog catching a car to describe the US strategy in Iraq: 'We raced to Baghdad, toppled the regime, and then didn't have a plan once we caught the car.' This highlights the lack of a clear post-invasion strategy, leading to 20 years of nation-building efforts that ultimately failed to achieve lasting stability or self-sustained change.

We raced to Baghdad, toppled the regime, and then didn't have a plan once we caught the car. You ever seen a dog catch a car? Like they don't know what to do next. And then we went into 20 years of nation building.

During preparations for OAF1 in Kuwait, US Marines were issued pigeons, intended to act as 'canaries in the coal mine' to detect chemical gas attacks. The expectation was that the pigeons would die first, signaling the need for troops to don gas masks, a method Pasciuti found 'wild' and indicative of the military's unpreparedness at the time.

We had like [expletive] pigeons that they trained us on these like pigeons that we were going to take with us because they're like the canary and the cole mites... They would just die first... 'private Tenko's dead, right? You know, I guess we should get our gas masks on.'

Pasciuti entered Iraq with a malfunctioning M16, unable to chamber a round, but was too afraid of his 'terrible' corporal to ask for help. This highlights how fear of internal authority can override the more immediate threat of combat, leading to significant personal risk and a 'condition three and a half' weapon system.

I was so afraid of my seniors. I was so afraid of certain members of my squad that I was unwilling to ask for help... I close my ejection port cover and I conceal my mistake and I enter into Iraq now gaining my combat action ribbon by entering into contact or whatever it is with a gun that wouldn't fire.

Pasciuti's first major engagement, against the Republican Guard and Fedayeen, was chaotic. He describes falling and jamming his rifle in the mud, then later achieving his first kills with a 203 grenade launcher and subsequently in close combat, witnessing the dying eyes of an Iraqi soldier. This experience marked a profound and immediate shift in his perception of life and death.

My very first gunfight, I fall over myself, bury my muzzle into the into the mud... I shot this guy a bunch in the chest. And then I remember his eyes... he had tears that were streaking through the brown dirt and I I'll never forget his eyes because his eyes were almost like gray. They were like searching and you can see I've seen it before on a wounded animal...

Due to rapid advance and outrunning logistics, Marines faced severe shortages of food, water, and even socks. Pasciuti recounts becoming so desensitized that he took spare socks from a dead enemy combatant, highlighting the brutal pragmatism and loss of humanity driven by extreme deprivation in combat.

I found a dude who had died from I mean it was [__] ugly, dude... I didn't care. I needed his spare socks and so I went into his pack and I grabbed his socks because mine were wasting away. They were melting away on my feet. had trench foot...

After being relegated to an administrative role, Pasciuti sought to try out for scout sniper training. His direct superior, a 'terrible' first sergeant, denied his request. However, Gunnery Sergeant Ricky Jackson, a respected infantry Marine, subtly encouraged Pasciuti to defy the order, telling him, 'Every man is in charge of his own destiny. If you're not here on Monday morning, I'll know where you're at.' This pivotal moment allowed Pasciuti to pursue his dream.

He says, 'Phoot, every man is in charge of his own destiny. If you're not here on Monday morning, I'll know where you're at.' So what he was doing was giving me an order that he couldn't openly give. He was giving me an order to follow my dreams.

Pasciuti observes that the Marine Corps is 'very well known for not being good at giving out medals.' He cites two instances where he believes actions were worthy of a Medal of Honor but only received a Navy Cross, suggesting a cultural reluctance to award higher commendations.

Perez ended up living... he was awarded the Navy Cross as well, of which I have consternation with because from what I saw, that was not Navy Crossworthy. That was [__] Medal of Honor worthy... the Marine Corps is is very well known for not being good at giving out medals.

AJ Pasciuti recounts his early struggles during sniper indoc, where he was physically a 'runt' and lacked basic land navigation skills, even bringing an Office Depot protractor instead of a military one. This led to him being considered a 'pig' (professionally instructed gunman) – a sniper in training, rather than a 'hog' (hunter of gunman), a graduate of scout sniper school.

I was the slowest PTER. I didn't know how to do land navigation super well. I didn't know what a protractor was, right? I literally went to Office Depot and brought a protractor. Not like a pro like not like a MGRS protractor.

In April 2004, after four Blackwater contractors were murdered and their bodies desecrated in Fallujah, U.S. politicians demanded military action. Marine commanders urged restraint, requesting more troops and a commitment not to withdraw. Despite initial success, political pressure from false reports of civilian casualties led to a withdrawal within 96 hours, granting the insurgency an 'unearned victory' and allowing them six months to fortify the city, directly contributing to increased American casualties in the later battle.

The marine commanders were the ones who actually urged restraint. They said, 'If you want us to go in, we're going to need more people. And the only thing that we ask you to do is if you send us in, do not pull us back.' ... within 96 hours of entering into Fallujah all the Marines had to stop their advance and pull back out of Fallujah. So that did two things technically did three things. It gave the mujahedin an unearned victory.

Corporal Ethan Place achieved 34 kills in Fallujah, 21 in a single day, by developing a new tactic. Recognizing that standard 5.56mm rounds were ineffective against insurgents high on amphetamines, he began targeting the pelvic girdle. This broke mobility and caused significant internal bleeding (2 liters of blood in the pelvis), ensuring incapacitation regardless of drug use, preventing 'zombie-like' fighters from continuing to engage.

What play started to do was he started to move towards the pelvic girdle. And so, with the pelvic girdle, no matter what amount of aphetamine you have, if you break the pelvic girdle, 2 L of blood sits in your pelvis, right? Also, if you snap the pelvic girdle, there's no movement.

In June 2004, a Marine sniper team led by Corporal Tommy Parker was ambushed and killed in Ramadi. Their M40 A1 sniper rifle and other equipment were taken by the insurgents and displayed online. This incident marked a significant escalation, as IEDs increased and a sniper threat emerged using American weapon systems, which was taken 'pretty seriously' by the Marines.

a marine sniper team had been in Rammani... was somehow uh ambushed and killed and with them they lost um when they were killed the the mujahedin took their uh all their equipment to include an M40 A1 sniper rifle. Corporal Tommy Parker was the name of the team leader who was killed.

After being kicked out of the sniper platoon for physical performance, Pasciuti received a 'stroke of luck' just weeks before the Fallujah deployment. He was brought back into the platoon as a 'pig' to manage new MSIDS (maritime secondary imagery dissemination system) technology, which involved computers and reconnaissance cameras. His Silicon Valley background made him uniquely suited for this role, despite resentment from other Marines who felt he didn't deserve a second chance.

they decided to bring me back into the sniper platoon as a again as a probationary period as a pig to manage the communications and the MSIDS systems. So technically I got a second shot at this. But I was a marked man, right?

On November 8th, 2004, Pasciuti, armed with a Barrett .50 caliber rifle, and Memo Sandival, with an M40, provided general support for the Marine advance into Fallujah. From a high-rise apartment, they engaged numerous targets, including destroying a technical vehicle. They were later joined by Navy SEAL snipers, including Chris Kyle, leading to a competitive but effective joint operation covering the northern flank.

I have a um Barrett 50 caliber special application scoped rifle. So, as a pig, I'm also carrying the biggest gun for some reason... And then all of a sudden I see an a camouflage spray painted M or M4 and then I see a Mitch helmet come above that and we're like I friendlies friendly you got friendlies up here friendlies and it is none other than at the time unknown two Navy Seal snipers one of them by the name of Chris Kyle comes up the stairs.

After a corpsman was wounded, Pasciuti was reassigned as a combat replacement to a line company sniper team under Sergeant Blake Cole, who had previously advocated for his removal. Cole put past issues aside, taking Pasciuti under his wing and teaching him everything. Cole pioneered 'ballsy' night missions, moving the four-man team a block into enemy territory to set up ambush positions, cutting down insurgents retreating from the infantry's daytime push.

He says, 'Listen, I advocated to kick you out of the platoon because you weren't up to the up to the task.' And he says, 'Doc, getting hit really [__] us, but you're here now. Stay tight and I'll teach you everything everything I know.' ... he would take us and we would move a block into enemy territory every single night and we would set up on a position... we would cut them down as they ran across the street to their next position.

Pasciuti passionately highlights the 'unhuman-like bravery' of 18 and 19-year-old infantry Marines in Fallujah. They fought house-to-house for four weeks straight with 'terrible weapon systems, terrible gear,' enduring constant combat and high casualties. He criticizes the algorithm and public perception that prioritizes special operators, arguing that the infantry are the true heroes whose stories are often overlooked and whose sacrifices are not adequately supported by non-profits.

The men that I have found to be the most heroic are the [__] infantry marines. Whether they be army, whether they be marines or or infantry, whether they be army or marines, because they have terrible weapon systems, terrible gear, right? They have they they have they're living on cigarettes and adrenaline, right? and they every single day would soldier up, soldier on and kick down a door when they knew somebody was on the other side.

The loss of Greg Rund on December 11th, 2004 (his mother Jane's birthday), underscores the profound and lasting impact of combat deaths on families. Pasciuti emphasizes the country's debt to Gold Star families, advocating for better support and community engagement. He highlights organizations like the Marine Reconnaissance Foundation and the Marine Gunners Association, which are all-volunteer and directly support Marines and their families, fostering 'brotherhood' beyond the battlefield.

December 11th was when we lost Greg Rund. And Greg Rund... helped me out when I was going through a really rough time... December 11th is Jane Run's birthday. And so Jane Run... was having a birthday party um at her home when the Marines showed up to her front door.

Attending sniper school in 2005 after combat experience, Pasciuti found it to be an incredibly demanding 12-week course with a 75% attrition rate, where 'attrition was the mission.' Despite a clerical error allowing him in with a failing PFT score, his instructors, Staff Sergeant Dave Slavski and Corporal Wesley Payne, pushed him relentlessly, focusing on making him physically strong to match his intellectual capabilities, preparing him for the immense responsibility of operating ahead of friendly lines.

They have about a 75% attrition rate. Um, and attrition at the time, attrition was the mission. ... I technically scored a 224 getting into school, uh, which did not meet the requirements, but through an error, like they miscounted my crunches.

Juba's videos, intended for propaganda and intimidation, inadvertently provided critical intelligence. By analyzing the videos' technical details (camera height, movement post-shot, lack of follow-up shots), Pasciuti's team deduced Juba's operational methods, including the strong possibility he was shooting from a vehicle.

He was videotaping and the videos were normally at what I would say hip level, hip to, you know, nipple level on an average size body... he would move away from the scene at a steady rate of speed but not bouncing. And so to us that went, 'okay, so he's not walking,' ... 'Holy [__] he's shooting from a car.'

The 'Hogs Tooth' is a symbolic trophy for snipers, representing the last round from a killed enemy sniper, believed to confer protection. Pasciuti's graduation, despite a near-failure in stalking, was secured by a mentor's intervention, highlighting a tradition of senior snipers 'pulling people forward' and fostering the next generation.

A hogs tooth is it goes by the the idea of live by the gun, die by the gun... The thing that I found out 20 years later when I was telling Wesley Payne this story... Dave Slaskski in the truck did the same thing for Wesley Payne when he was a sniper student... it's this way of being able to pull people forward.

During a meticulous search of Juba's suspected kill sites, Pasciuti discovered two pieces of Lake City (LC) brass. This was a critical 'target indicator' because American snipers are rigorously trained never to leave their brass, confirming that Juba was using an American rifle and was a 'trained marksman' rather than a conventional enemy sniper.

my hand rolls across two pieces of brass... On the back of the brass, it says LC, Lake City Ammunition Manufacturing Plant... I knew that no American sniper would have done this because the Army sniper school is just as good... This is not something that we we don't leave our brass laying around.

Marines faced increasing operational constraints in Iraq, such as mandated six-to-eight-man sniper elements and extensive body armor requirements, which severely hampered their stealth and effectiveness. These rules, imposed by higher echelons, prioritized 'security equals numbers' over the sniper's core principle of 'stealth is our security,' forcing snipers to improvise by shedding gear in the field.

In 2006, we were mandated to be in six-man elements at a minimum... These are all levied on us from higher echelons, not understanding that our stealth is our security. They think that security equals numbers... I would have to take my helmet or my... plates... take all that [__] off, put it in my ruck, and then continue to patrol if I wanted to.

During a stakeout for an IED implacer, Pasciuti observed a Sony Handycam in a suspicious, tinted gray sedan. After confirming the camera and a hand manipulating it, and with artillery support denied due to a nearby mosque, Pasciuti took a shot, believing it to be an IED threat. This initiated a chaotic engagement, resulting in the death of two individuals in the car, one of whom was Juba's spotter.

I catch this little thing and I was like, 'What was that?' And so I get behind my gun and I have three power on at the on the Schmitten Bender and I'm looking at it and then I zoom in to like eight power and then I zoom in to 12 power and I go, 'Holy [__] it's a Sony Handy Cam.' ... Captain Coleman breaks the total protocol and he says, 'Pashooti, take the shot.'

After the engagement, the Marines discovered a McMillan stock, Remington 700 short-action rifle in the car. Upon checking the serial number, it was identified as the M40 A3 rifle belonging to Tommy Parker, a Marine sniper who had been killed and whose rifle was lost two years prior. This recovery was a significant moment of poetic justice for the Marine sniper community.

McMillan stock. Remington 700 shortaction barrel. A scope I don't recognize. ... He says Remington model 700, November 8 or whatever the the numbers are. And now I've got my entire team in the room at this point and we realize right there it was 24 sniper rifle. It was Tommy Parker's rifle.

Marines hold Navy Corpsmen in extremely high regard, considering them 'team moms' whose word on health and rest is absolute. The relationship is so sacred that insulting a Corpsman is considered worse than insulting a Marine directly, and Corpsmen are one of the two people Marines cry for when dying (the other being their mother).

The way that we treat our corman in the Marines is you can insult me, but you can never insult my Corman. The relationship that we have to corman is is is the reverence that we have for them. The two people that Marines cry for when they're dying is their mother and their doc.

Marine Reconnaissance, a smaller and distinct special operations capable unit within the Marine Corps, emphasizes team cohesion and understanding 'commander's intent.' Their training, including carrying 380lb Zodiac boats, focuses on identifying and covering teammates' weaknesses rather than exploiting them, fostering a 'team above all else' mentality. They also have unique traditions like the 'Aruga' greeting, stemming from their submarine origins.

What Recon does is we try to find each other's weaknesses, but not exploit them, but find places to be able to fill that gap and wanting to be able to make sure that the team as a whole... the team was above all else.

During a long-range reconnaissance mission in Afghanistan with the British SAS, Pasciuti observed their unique 'cupa' tradition. Despite being in active pursuit of drug dealers in the Helmand province, the SAS would stop every four hours for a cup of tea and chocolate, showcasing a distinct cultural approach to sustained operations.

we would stop every four hours for what they called a cupa, right? So, they would stop for a cup of tea. Like literally in the middle of Afghanistan, we would stop in the middle of the desert and everyone would stop and have a piece of chocolate and a cup of tea and that was their, you know, their whole, you know, uh, it was really fun to see like the culture come through that.

A complex helicopter assault mission was undermined from the outset by a lack of trust between the reconnaissance platoon and the infantry unit they were supporting. Critical details, like the 'dummy drop' procedure for helicopter insertions, were not effectively communicated, leading to Matt's team being dropped in the wrong, exposed location. This adversarial relationship and communication breakdown directly contributed to the mission's tragic outcome.

Pasciuti states, 'We had a pretty poor relationship with our supported unit... they didn't trust recon... we had a pretty adversarial relationship because we looked different.' He describes how the 'three dummy drops... wasn't communicated effectively,' causing Matt's team to be dropped in the wrong LZ. He also recounts arguing with the operations officer to delay the mission due to compromised teams, only to be denied.

During the intense ambush on Matt's team, Pasciuti, despite being concussed and miles away, was forced to choose between breaking his position to aid his best friend and maintaining his assigned role to support the larger infantry assault. His decision to prioritize the infantry, based on the Marine Recon ethos of loyalty to the riflemen, highlights the brutal choices faced in combat.

Pasciuti describes listening to Matt's desperate calls for air support and facing 'a choice to make because I was listening to my best friend who was decisively engaged by a larger enemy force.' He elaborates, 'Run to save my friend or potentially save my friend or hold my position because my role was staying in position when the air assault started and I needed to be there for the infantry marines.'

After the loss of three Marines, including his best friend, Pasciuti was 'broken' and struggled with suicidal ideations. His recovery and renewed purpose came from an anonymous letter from a 14-year-old girl, Angela, who expressed gratitude and understanding of the sacrifices made. This simple act of connection from home provided a powerful 'why' to continue living.

Pasciuti recounts finding Angela's letter in an 'any Marine box' and reading her words about the poster and Matt's death. He states, 'She saved me. She saved me.' He later realized, 'I was no longer living for Matt... I was living for Angela because that little girl and her hope and her determination... was something so powerful.'