The Rural Vs. Urban Threat To Democracy | Suzanne Mettler | TMR

The U.S. political system, with features like the Senate (two senators per state regardless of population) and the Electoral College, inherently grants disproportionate power to less populated areas. Historically, this power was not concentrated in one party. However, since the 1990s, these institutional levers have become almost exclusively consolidated within the Republican Party, allowing it to govern and appoint judges with a minority of the national popular vote.

California's population is nearly 70 times Wyoming's, yet both receive two senators. Republicans frequently win the Senate with states representing less than 50% of the U.S. population. Donald Trump, who lost the popular vote, appointed Supreme Court justices confirmed by a Senate elected by a minority of Americans.

The growing political divide, which saw rural counties shift dramatically towards Republican voting, began in the 1990s due to profound economic changes. Rural areas experienced significant job and population loss driven by agricultural consolidation, de-industrialization, and shifts in extractive industries. This economic distress created a fertile ground for political resentment.

Counties that lost jobs or population moved towards Republican voting. This trend was linked to the loss of family farms (1980s onward) and the impact of de-industrialization (1990s-early 2000s) on rural manufacturing jobs.

Following economic decline, rural communities developed a sense of 'elite overreach,' feeling that urban Democrats, perceived as more affluent and out of touch, imposed policies without consultation or respect. This resentment was amplified by a vacuum left by declining labor unions and filled by conservative organizations like evangelical churches and NRA-affiliated groups, which effectively mobilized rural voters for the Republican Party.

Rural residents felt Democrats created policies 'forced upon them' without understanding community needs. While unions declined, evangelical churches and NRA groups, more prevalent per capita in rural counties, actively connected voters to the Republican Party, performing functions parties once did.

The political polarization between rural and urban areas is primarily a phenomenon among white voters. While racism is present in both urban and rural settings, its increased concentration and political salience in rural areas emerged *after* the initial rise of place-based inequality, suggesting it became a mechanism to channel economic frustrations rather than the primary cause of the political shift.

The growing gap is among white people, rural versus urban; Black and Latino Americans in both areas vote similarly. In the late 90s/early 2000s, racism was equally prevalent among non-Hispanic whites in urban and rural areas. It became slightly more concentrated in rural areas from 2008-2020, following the rise of economic inequality, making it 'more salient' as a response to perceived neglect.

A significant factor in the Democratic Party's decline in rural areas is its long-term disengagement from local, year-round organizing. Unlike the Republican Party, which benefits from a robust network of socially integrated conservative organizations, Democrats often start from scratch each election cycle, failing to build trust or address material needs in these communities.

County chairs reported needing more support from state and national parties, specifically 'year-round full-time organizers, ideally from rural places.' The successful 50-state strategy under Howard Dean (2005-2007), which led to Democratic gains, was later abandoned under the Obama administration.