JD Vance Will Say Absolutely Anything (w/ Seth Jones) | Shield of the Republic

The US defense industrial base, once capable of producing nearly 100,000 aircraft annually during WWII, significantly declined after the Cold War. A key event was the 'Last Supper' in 1993, where the Pentagon explicitly pushed for massive consolidation, reducing the number of prime contractors and leading to a market focused on fewer, more exotic systems rather than mass production capacity.

Seth Jones details the shift from 6,000 aircraft in 1939 to 100,000 by 1944, then explains the 1993 'Last Supper' where Pentagon leadership aimed to reduce the number of companies building bombers from three to one, and helicopter manufacturers from four to two, leading to widespread mergers and market exits.

China's defense industrial base is currently operating on a 'wartime footing,' producing weapons at an immense scale and volume designed to deter or win a major conflict. This includes a shipbuilding capacity 230 times that of the US, producing sophisticated destroyers, frigates, submarines, and aircraft carriers. Five of the top ten global defense companies are now Chinese, demonstrating their rapid industrial buildup.

Jones describes flying over the South China Sea and observing the 'incredible' number of PLA navy vessels and aircraft. He states China's shipbuilding capacity is '230 times the size of the United States' and notes that five of the top ten global defense companies are Chinese.

Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Red Sea have exposed severe and alarming shortages in US munitions stockpiles. The US depleted a decade's worth of anti-tank weapons in Ukraine in just a few months and a quarter of its THAAD missiles in the Red Sea in a matter of days, highlighting the inability of the current industrial base to sustain even limited engagements, let alone a protracted war.

Jones states, 'the US used up roughly a decade worth of anti-tank weapons in only a few months of the war [Ukraine].' He adds that in the Red Sea, 'the US... fired a quarter of its THAAD missiles in a few days against Iran.'

The US defense acquisition system operates with a 'peacetime mindset,' prioritizing bureaucracy, process, and cost-saving over maximizing production capacity and rapid innovation. This regulatory focus prevents the industrial base from quickly scaling up to meet wartime demands, a stark contrast to historical periods like WWII or even the Cold War.

Jones explains that in peacetime, the government 'thinks like regulators,' focusing on 'saving costs' and 'regulations.' He contrasts this with wartime, where the focus must be on 'minimizing unnecessary regulations' and 'maximizing production capacity.' He notes that current acquisition systems 'are focused on process, bureaucracy, not about getting maximum production capacity of systems to fight and win wars.'

A significant loss of trust exists between leading US technology companies and the government, exemplified by Anthropic's objections to the Pentagon's use of its AI tool, Claude. Anthropic's concerns center on potential mass surveillance of American citizens and autonomous lethal systems without human oversight, reflecting a broader distrust in the government's adherence to legal norms.

The hosts discuss Anthropic's objections to the DoD using Claude for 'mass surveillance of American citizens' and 'autonomous lethal systems' without a human in the loop. Elliot Cohen notes this 'speaks to the complete loss of trust... that a very very important and actually on the whole fairly ethical company' has in the US government.