How Israel Came To Dominate US Foreign Policy w/ Noah Kulwin, Brendan James | MR Live

The hosts argue against simplistic binary narratives (Israel as a US puppet vs. Israel controlling the US). Instead, they emphasize that the relationship evolved through specific historical contingencies, where US and Israeli interests sometimes aligned, sometimes diverged, and were often influenced by domestic US political considerations. Early US presidents, including Truman, initially resisted the formation of a Jewish state, but political pressures related to re-election and the post-Holocaust refugee crisis shifted policy.

Brendan James states, 'I don't see I mean, of course, it can function in concert with the US. But as for the claim that um Israel is merely a proxy or puppet for the United States, um yeah, I don't find that persuasive.' Noah Kulwin adds, 'I think it generally helps kind of resisting the binary... in our story what we sort of illustrate is that actually it's you know, it's it's much more complicated.' [00:23:26], [00:25:25]

President Truman was initially opposed to supporting a Jewish state, with his foreign policy apparatus and the oil industry also against it. However, domestic political considerations, particularly the need to win the state of New York and secure the Jewish vote for his re-election, coupled with the post-Holocaust refugee crisis, pressured him to recognize Israel. This highlights how internal US political dynamics can override strategic foreign policy advice.

Noah Kulwin recounts Clark Clifford's advice to Truman: 'If you want to become the president, you have to win the state of New York... if you want to get New York City, you have to have the Jewish vote.' [00:39:45]

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and other cornerstone organizations of the Israel lobby were formed in the 1950s. This was a direct response to the international backlash and negative public relations Israel received after the 1953 Qibya massacre, which led President Eisenhower to suspend aid. The lobby's initial focus was to ensure the American Jewish community spoke with a unified pro-Israel voice and to build political influence in Washington.

Noah Kulwin explains, 'the formation of AIPAC comes out of a very specific crisis which was the 1953 massacre of a village called Qibya... Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, used it as a pretext to do something that they were already planning to do... to, you know, suspend aid.' [00:47:27]

Despite President Nixon's personal anti-Semitic views, his administration, along with Henry Kissinger, dramatically increased cooperation and military aid to Israel. This strategic shift positioned Israel as a crucial anti-Soviet ally in the Middle East, laying the groundwork for the deeply close relationship seen today. This move complicated existing partnerships with Arab monarchies but cemented Israel's indispensable role in US Cold War strategy.

Brendan James notes, 'the Nixon move in '73 came about during the Arab-Israeli War of that year... we just airlifted 20,000 tons of material to them... launched an an incredibly um uh like engorged uh commitment to Israel.' [00:50:25]

While the Israel lobby's influence grew, some Republican presidents demonstrated willingness to challenge Israel. Reagan, despite being pro-Israel, confronted Prime Minister Begin over the brutal Lebanese invasion, even threatening a 'holocaust' in his diary. George H.W. Bush successfully withheld billions in loan guarantees to pressure Israel to halt settlements, demonstrating a capacity for US presidents to act against Israeli interests when they perceived a conflict with broader US strategic goals, a capacity largely absent in more recent administrations.

Noah Kulwin describes Reagan's confrontation: 'he gets Begin he threatens him on the phone says like a holocaust... and Begin backs down.' [00:57:00]. Brendan James details H.W. Bush's actions: 'George Bush the first wanted to have a peace conference... the Israelis won't promise that uh the monies we give them through these loan guarantees essentially aren't going to settle people in the West Bank.' [01:00:29]

The Israel lobby's influence has qualitatively changed since the 1980s, becoming 'vaster' and 'normalized.' This power, leveraged through significant resources in a political system increasingly permeable to special interests, has led to outcomes detrimental to US strategic interests, such as the scrapping of the Iran nuclear deal. The relationship, while 'special,' is characterized as 'strategically sucky' for the US, often leading to punitive and dogmatic foreign policy decisions.

Noah Kulwin states, 'the Israel lobby completely blown it up because of their like short-sighted interest in their own goals. And I think that they you know it's there there is a real the way the only reason they're even able to achieve this self-destructive stuff is because of like the resources that they're willing to leverage and that our system lets them leverage.' [01:05:31]. Brendan James adds, 'I still think it is a strategic relationship. It just strategically sucks.' [01:09:42]