Does This Theory Explain the Entire Republican Party? (w/ John Ganz) | Bulwark Podcast

Trump's actions are driven by personal whims and a transactional 'deal' mentality, rather than systemic thinking or coherent ideology. This makes political analysis difficult, as his positions can shift rapidly. His approach to issues like the Iran war exemplifies this: talked into a simplistic idea, found it tough, then walked away to pursue a 'new deal,' praising former 'lunatics' as 'reasonable people.'

Ganz states, 'With the actions of the Trump administration, it's very difficult I find to give them any coherence because it's so based on Trump's personal whims and his own, you know, very idiosyncratic and mercurial way of doing things.' He cites the Iran war as an example where Trump was 'talked into it,' found it 'tougher than he was led to believe,' and then 'decided to walk away.'

The guest's book, 'When the Clock Broke,' details how figures like Murray Rothbard and Sam Francis foresaw and advocated for a right-wing populism that Trump later embodied. This involved bypassing traditional media, directly attacking elites, and adopting protectionist, 'America First' foreign policies. Trump's own instincts, shaped by his near financial ruin in the late 80s/early 90s, aligned with this paranoid, zero-sum worldview.

Ganz explains, 'Rothbard foresaw the type of politics that Trump practices as a path forward for like the hard right, which is basically a kind of what he called it at the time, right-wing populism.' He connects Trump's 'protectionist instincts' and 'adversarial' view of the world to this period, noting Trump's 'near brush with ruin in the late '80s, early '90s' intensified his paranoia.

The rise of right-wing populism in both the early 90s and 2016 is attributed to a combination of economic anxieties among the middle and lower-middle classes and the fragmentation of mass media. While media changes allow fringe voices to reach broader audiences, the underlying appeal of populist politicians stems from a widespread feeling of being economically squeezed, dispossessed, and unrepresented by corrupt politicians.

Ganz states, 'the appeal of these politicians only makes sense if you consider the trajectory of the society and the fact that you have large members of the middle and lower middle classes feeling increasingly squeezed and dispossessed and feeling that the only and feeling unrepresented by their politicians who they feel are intrinsically corrupt.' He links Trump's rise to the 2008 crash and the perception of a 'rigged' system.

J.D. Vance's embrace of René Girard's mimetic theory and subsequent conversion to Christianity is portrayed as a utilitarian, almost cynical, response to social and psychological needs rather than genuine faith. Vance, influenced by Peter Thiel, appears to adopt religion as a social necessity to align with perceived 'smart people' and to cope with the 'painful' competitive pressures of elite society, rather than a deep spiritual conviction.

Ganz notes, 'what he's describing there is not really being moved by religious sentiment. It's kind of realizing that the smart people that he wants to be in with are religious and then kind of changing his tune.' He adds that Vance's approach, and that of many conservatives, views religion as 'some kind of social or psychological necessity, and that's not quite the same as believing.'