Iran War Consequences: Will Epic Fury be an Epic Failure? (w/ Robert Kagan) | Bulwark on Sunday

The Iran war has significantly deepened the divide between the United States and its traditional allies in Europe and Asia. European nations, facing an existential threat from Russian aggression, view the war as a strategic disaster. It has led to skyrocketing oil prices, which directly benefit Russia by providing billions for its war chest, and has diverted critical US weaponry, like Patriot interceptors, away from Ukraine. Asian allies, particularly Japan, are highly dependent on Middle East oil and were not consulted, experiencing severe economic damage. Crucial US forces, including the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, have been redeployed from the Western Pacific to the Middle East, weakening deterrence against potential Chinese aggression.

Kagan states the war has 'drive a deeper wedge between the United States and pretty much all of its allies' (02:50). He notes the war provides Putin with 'tens of billions of dollars' (04:51) and burns through 'major stocks of weaponry and particularly Patriot and other forms of interceptors' (05:17) needed by Ukraine. Japan's 95% oil dependence on the Middle East and the redeployment of forces 'critical to any response to a Chinese attack on on Taiwan' (09:29) are cited.

The war's impact on China and Middle Eastern Gulf States suggests a re-evaluation of US reliability. China, while dependent on Middle Eastern oil, has vast reserves and is receiving oil shipments from Iran, mitigating the economic impact. Militarily, China may perceive US caution and resource diversion as an encouragement rather than a deterrent, especially given the US unwillingness to risk naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Gulf States, who opposed the war, have suffered economic damage to their investment and tourism sectors and now question the US's ability to protect them, potentially seeking partnerships with China.

Kagan questions if China is 'given pause by this or whether they're encouraged by it' (12:45), noting US forces dedicated to the Western Pacific are 'being sent to the Middle East' (09:39). He states Gulf States were 'very vocal in saying that they were against the war' (14:10) and 'the United States undertook this war and then was not able actually to protect them' (15:44), making China a 'pretty good partner' (16:03).

The United States is at a critical juncture, facing a choice between establishing a long-term, large-scale military presence in the Middle East to sustain any gains from the war or withdrawing and risking regional instability. The initial goal of restructuring the region to eliminate the Iranian threat has created new instabilities, including potential chaos within Iran. Sustaining a new balance of power requires an enduring commitment, which the current administration appears unwilling to make, contrasting with past US interventions where a sense of post-conflict responsibility existed.

Kagan describes Trump's choice as 'either go all in... [implying] a huge long-term American military commitment... or to try to find some way to bug out and declare victory' (01:46). He later reiterates the 'fork in the road' (23:37) to either 'establish a long-term large American military presence' (24:04) or 'pull out and then let things take whatever course they're going to take' (24:17). He contrasts this with Bush's 'Pottery Barn rule' (25:33) for Iraq.

The ongoing war carries significant domestic risks, potentially serving as a tool to suppress opposition and control information. The administration has already shown signs of attempting to silence critical media reports, labeling them 'unpatriotic' or 'fake news.' There are concerns that the government could use national security dispensations to crack down on anti-war protests, potentially classifying them as 'domestic terrorism,' thereby consolidating power and influencing elections.

Kagan worries the war is a 'potential weapon in his holster against domestic opposition' (42:17). He cites a warning about 'looking into the licenses of the news organizations' (42:31) and the administration complaining about 'news criticism' (42:42). He raises the possibility of anti-war protests becoming 'domestic terrorists' (44:05).