The Great Battleship Debate | John Konrad of gCaptain and Zach Cooper of AEI

John Konrad argues that modern battleships are essential for securing critical maritime choke points (e.g., Strait of Hormuz, Taiwan Strait, Luzon Strait) and protecting vulnerable US merchant marine logistics ships. He highlights the limitations of current destroyers, which have limited magazine depth, high missile costs against drone swarms, and insufficient fuel capacity for prolonged station keeping. Battleships, with larger magazine capacity, enhanced survivability, and potential for command and control of drone swarms, could provide necessary close support and shore bombardment for ground forces.

Konrad notes the US Merchant Marine crews 40% of Navy ships and lacks protection. Destroyers in the Red Sea face high costs per intercept and limited VLS cells (00:08:56). He advocates for a 'destroyer with larger magazine depth and a lot more room for fuel bunkers' (00:09:53) and 'bombardment capability' for Marines (00:11:23). He also points to the French frigates' effective use of deck guns against drones (00:14:42).

Zach Cooper questions the battleship's cost-effectiveness and its fit within the Navy's broader shift towards distributed operations. He argues that centralizing significant capability in one expensive ship goes against the trend of smaller, harder-to-hit units. He suggests that in a 'China fight,' surface assets are increasingly at risk, and funds might be better allocated to submarines or other sea denial capabilities. He also doubts the realism of the $17.5 billion budget for a single ship, especially without development money.

Cooper states the budget allocates $17.5 billion for one ship in FY28 with no development money (00:04:03). He notes the Navy's move towards distributed operations (00:03:38) and his concern that surface assets are 'increasingly at risk' (00:04:58), suggesting submarines might be more cost-effective (00:05:05). He emphasizes the shift from sea control to sea denial, where neither side may be able to operate surface ships with confidence (00:16:00).

Both speakers express concern over the political feasibility of the battleship program, particularly due to its association with former President Trump. Cooper believes a new administration, especially a Democratic one, would likely cancel the program, rendering initial investments wasted. Konrad acknowledges the political misstep of naming it but argues the underlying strategic need for such a platform could still garner support if properly articulated by the Navy.

Cooper states his 'sense from Capitol Hill is that there's a pretty mixed view' and that Democrats 'would be one of the first things they would cancel' (00:05:13). He later confirms, 'I don't think it does' have a chance of staying alive if Democrats come into power (00:47:39). Konrad concedes that 'the average person is not happy that Trump's putting his name on it' and 'that that is a political misstep' (00:35:42).

The debate highlights the severe challenges facing the US shipbuilding industry, including a poor track record of program execution, workforce shortages, and outdated methods. Konrad argues that the battleship program, despite its initial high cost, could force a necessary transformation towards modular, commercial-standard designs, potentially built in collaboration with foreign yards like those in South Korea, to revitalize the industrial base.

The host points out the 'track record in naval building right now has not been stellar' (00:42:15), citing issues with the Ford carrier, LCS, and frigates. Cooper notes yards are 'entirely focused on... workforce challenges' (00:44:22). Konrad states, '$17 billion is not enough to build a battleship... unless we really adopt how I built ships in South Korea' (00:36:13), advocating for 'modular design' and potentially building the first two in Korea (00:55:00).