Trump Needs Approval for This War (w/ Michael O'Hanlon) | Shield of the Republic

Michael O'Hanlon contends that American grand strategy has almost always been assertive and expansionist, not isolationist. He cites historical examples like territorial expansion against Native Americans and Mexico, and the pursuit of trade rights, as evidence of a continuous 'restlessness' and a drive to expand influence and prosperity beyond existing borders. This challenges the common narrative of US isolationism, suggesting it was largely confined to specific periods like the 1920s and 30s.

O'Hanlon refers to the US Mexico War (1846-1848) as a 'war of choice' or 'aggression' for manifest destiny, and the Quasi-War with France and War of 1812 as driven by insistence on trade rights. He states, 'We've almost always had some restlessness. And even if one president may not have taken a big next step, the one after him usually did. And that's how we got to be such a big and powerful country.'

O'Hanlon argues that the US has historically been more successful at 'waging peace' – achieving its core grand strategic goals – than at 'waging war' – winning specific battlefield conflicts. He points to Vietnam and Afghanistan as military defeats where, paradoxically, the US still achieved broader strategic objectives like demonstrating commitment to containing communism or deterring future terrorist attacks from specific regions.

Regarding Vietnam, O'Hanlon notes it 'showed the world, including Moscow and Beijing, we were quite committed to that if we're prepared to fight that hard in Southeast Asia.' For Afghanistan, he states, 'the Taliban seem to have gotten the message that it's not a smart idea to harbor ISIS or al-Qaeda to plan attacks against the United States. And we see to my mind no evidence that they're doing so... and that's a grand strategic success even if it's a military defeat.'

The US has historically relied on 'offsets' – asymmetric advantages – to counter adversaries' conventional strengths. The first offset was nuclear superiority in the 1950s, allowing for 'massive retaliation' against Soviet conventional forces. The second, in the late 1970s, focused on stealth and precision-guided munitions, leading to concepts like 'AirLand Battle.' The current 'third offset' aims to leverage emerging technologies like AI, autonomy, and hypersonics to maintain a qualitative edge, though O'Hanlon views it as more amorphous and less clearly defined in its battlefield application.

O'Hanlon details Eisenhower's 'new look' defense policy based on nuclear superiority (24:49) and the development of stealth and precision munitions under Bill Perry and Harold Brown (26:21). He describes the third offset as 'a grab bag of all the sexy new technologies we all talk about' but notes 'there is no obvious American advantage like hypersonics for example.'

Despite the frequent bypassing of Congress by presidents in initiating military actions, O'Hanlon advocates for Congress to reassert its constitutional role, especially through its power of the purse. He suggests that Congress should scrutinize supplemental funding requests for ongoing conflicts (like the Iran war) to limit the executive's ability to escalate or prolong engagements without explicit legislative approval.

O'Hanlon notes that 'the proclivity of post-World War II American presidents to act without congressional permission or authorization is quite frequent.' He proposes that Congress 'don't give President Trump $200 billion because that's far and beyond what any, you know, several week continuation of this war might require. And if Trump winds up escalating or wanting to escalate or prolong this thing over substantial period, he should need to make that case to Congress.'

The current geopolitical landscape, marked by conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, has exposed critical deficiencies in the US defense industrial base, particularly regarding munition stockpiles and production capacity. O'Hanlon emphasizes the need for significant, multi-year investment to replenish depleted inventories and build surge capacity, not just for immediate needs but also to deter potential adversaries like China and ensure readiness for future conflicts.

The host highlights 'the perilous state of our defense industrial base and the state of our munition stockpiles' and the 'immense numbers of munitions' expended. O'Hanlon agrees, stating, 'I do want that supplemental to pass and fast to the tune of 60 to 75 billion largely for immediate replenishment or as fast as possible of inventory. And second, to your point about capacity, production capacity, I think that would be a very good debate to center this year's defense authorization act on.'