This War Is Way More Complicated Than You Think (w/ Jason Burke) | Shield of the Republic

Hosts Eric Edelman and Elliot Cohen criticize much of the media, particularly the BBC and New York Times, for 'fatuous' reporting on the Iran war. They argue that coverage is often 'overwhelmingly tilted' towards predicting the war's failure, sometimes even 'wanting it to fail,' rather than analyzing its complexities. This includes overlooking internal Iranian vulnerabilities like food insecurity, water shortages, and the potential for widespread riots, which are critical factors in the regime's stability.

Elliot Cohen cites BBC journalists John Simpson and Jeremy Bowen 'tutting' about Ali Larajani's death without mentioning his role in massacres (01:23). He also points to New York Times headlines like 'Israel is picking off Iran's leadership but decapitation has its limits' (02:59), which he frames as starting with an assumption of failure. Eric Edelman mentions Joe Kent, a former counterterrorism head, being framed as a 'truth teller' by some outlets after peddling anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (06:40).

The hosts express significant concern about the war's 'downstream effects' on the international energy economy, specifically liquefied natural gas (LNG), helium, and petrochemicals, which are essential for industrial production and chip manufacturing. They highlight the strategic challenges of clearing the Strait of Hormuz, noting the US Navy's historical planning but also current deficiencies like retired minesweepers. The war also creates complex dynamics among Gulf States, potentially driving them closer to Israel or towards nuclear self-reliance, and influences China's strategic calculations regarding US military power.

Eric Edelman is 'particularly concerned about literally the downstream effects on the international energy economy of a continuation of the war' (08:27), specifically LNG, helium, and petrochemicals from Qatar (08:45). Elliot Cohen discusses the difficulty of clearing the Strait of Hormuz, mentioning mines, cruise missiles, and suicide boats, and the US Navy's 45 years of planning (09:23). He also notes the UAE's Anar Gargosh stating the conflict is 'driving us into the arms of the Israelis' (11:37). The discussion includes how China's Xi Jinping might perceive the US/Israeli military operation (15:06).

Guest Jason Burke argues that the deep roots of jihadi extremism and other forms of modern terrorism trace back to the mid-1960s and 1970s, a period of 'great revolutionary energy.' This era saw the simultaneous rise of both secular nationalist (often left-leaning) and radical Islamist movements. The shift in the global left's perception of Israel post-1967, from progressive to 'settler colonialism,' intersected with Palestinian nationalism and a transnational youth rebellion. New technologies like air travel and television enabled 'performative violence,' making terrorist acts highly visible and impactful.

Jason Burke states his book 'The Revolutionists' found the starting point for extremist movements in the 'mid-60s, the late 60s' (23:22), characterized by 'great revolutionary energy' (24:32). He explains the shift in the left's view of Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War (26:06) and the role of 'performative violence' (27:11). Elliot Cohen highlights the impact of 'airplane travel' and 'television being widely available' on the nature of terrorism (31:23).

Burke details that state sponsorship of terrorism in the 1970s and 80s was far more complex than a simple client-patron relationship. States like Libya directly commissioned and funded attacks, while the Soviet Union and its satellites had nuanced, dynamic relationships with groups like the PFLP, providing training and weapons but also seeking intelligence and favors. Militant figures often transitioned between ideological camps; Imad Mughniyeh, for example, started with secular Palestinian groups (Fatah) but was influenced by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Shia clerics, eventually becoming a key figure in Hezbollah.

Burke describes Gaddafi's direct involvement in commissioning and paying for terrorist attacks (48:40), potentially including the Munich 1972 attacks and the 1975 OPEC attack (49:16). He contrasts this with the KGB's 'nuanced' relationship with groups like the PFLP, where the KGB asked groups to 'go easy on the civilian casualties' and groups pushed back (50:03). Burke discusses Imad Mughniyeh's trajectory from fighting with Fatah in Lebanon to being influenced by the Iranian Revolution and becoming a key figure in Hezbollah (54:29).