Bulwark Takes
Bulwark Takes
March 31, 2026

Trump Says He’s Talking to a “New Regime” in Iran (w/ Sue Gordon)

Quick Read

Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon dissects the US-Iran relationship under the Trump administration, revealing Iran's strategic patience, the degradation of US intelligence, and the limited, problematic off-ramps in the current standoff.
JCPOA effectively constrained Iran's nuclear program, but sanctions relief fueled regional proxy wars.
Iran strategically sought to draw the US into a hot war to weaken American alliances.
US intelligence capabilities and alliances have degraded, limiting effective 'off-ramps' for the current crisis.

Summary

Sue Gordon, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, provides an expert analysis of the US-Iran relationship, particularly during the first Trump administration. She explains that the JCPOA was largely effective in constraining Iran's nuclear program, but the sanctions relief allowed Iran to fund proxy forces, leading to regional destabilization. Gordon highlights Iran's strategic goal of drawing the US into a hot war to weaken American coalitions and enhance their own regional standing. She characterizes Iran as a 'patient adversary' with a deep-rooted culture, making regime change a complex and ill-prepared undertaking for the US. Gordon also details the degradation of US intelligence capabilities due to reduced physical presence, strained alliances, and the over-release of sensitive information. She concludes that the current US approach has left a difficult economic and geopolitical situation, with limited viable off-ramps, suggesting an eventual return to a JCPOA-like agreement is the most probable, albeit challenging, outcome.
This analysis offers a rare, insider perspective on the intelligence community's assessment of Iran during a critical period. It exposes the strategic miscalculations and unintended consequences of US policy, particularly regarding the JCPOA withdrawal and the pursuit of 'maximum pressure.' Understanding these dynamics is essential for comprehending the current geopolitical landscape, the limitations of military intervention, and the long-term challenges in dealing with complex adversaries like Iran, especially concerning the erosion of US intelligence capabilities and alliances.

Takeaways

  • The JCPOA was largely effective in constraining Iran's nuclear weapon development, according to intelligence assessments during the first Trump administration.
  • Iran used sanctions relief money to fund proxy forces and destabilize the region, leading to increased saber-rattling.
  • Iran deliberately tried to provoke the US into a 'hot war' to weaken US coalitions and improve its own diplomatic position.
  • Iran is a 'patient adversary' and a regional power with a 6,000-year-old society, making 'shock and awe' or simple military submission ineffective.
  • US intelligence capabilities regarding Iran have degraded due to reduced physical presence, damaged alliances, and increased public release of sensitive intelligence.
  • The current US military actions, while demonstrating impressive foundational intelligence, lack the operational intelligence needed for effective regime change or diplomatic off-ramps.
  • The US faces extremely limited and problematic off-ramps in the current Iran situation, with walking away or small-scale military intervention carrying severe economic and geopolitical risks.
  • The Trump administration's approach often lacked consideration for second and third-order effects, leading to unintended strategic consequences.
  • An eventual agreement with Iran will likely resemble the JCPOA, as Iran will not relinquish its nuclear capability entirely due to its regional relevance.

Insights

1JCPOA's Effectiveness and Iran's Strategic Response

The intelligence community assessed that the JCPOA was largely effective in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. However, the financial relief provided through the deal was used by Iran to bolster its proxy forces, leading to increased regional destabilization and aggressive actions.

The worldwide threat assessment of 2019 indicated the JCPOA was largely constraining Iran's nuclear development. Concurrently, money from incentives was used to develop weapons capabilities and fund proxy forces, causing damage in the region.

2Iran's Intent to Provoke a Hot War for Diplomatic Leverage

During the first Trump administration, Iran actively sought to draw the United States into a 'hot war.' This was not an attempt to militarily defeat the US, but rather a calculated strategy to weaken the US's coalition with allies and enhance Iran's own diplomatic standing by making the US appear as the aggressor.

Iran was 'doing a lot of things in our estimation to try and suck the US into a hot war with them.' The goal was to 'weaken our ability to have a coalition and that would increase their position.'

3Degradation of US Intelligence Capabilities on Iran

US intelligence capabilities regarding Iran have likely diminished since 2019. This is attributed to a reduced physical presence in the region, damaged alliances leading to less intelligence sharing, and a policy of more openly releasing sensitive intelligence, which can compromise sources and methods.

Signals include a lack of US physical presence in the region, strained alliances leading to distrust in intelligence sharing, and a trend of using intelligence more openly, as seen with Russia and Ukraine.

4Limited and Problematic Off-Ramps for the Current Standoff

The current situation with Iran presents extremely difficult and limited 'off-ramps' for the US. Simply declaring victory and withdrawing would leave Iran capable of disrupting global energy routes (Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea) and threatening Gulf States. Small-scale military intervention is insufficient given Iran's geography and the scale of previous conflicts, while full-scale regime change is unplanned and would lead to further instability.

Iran can 'wreak havoc with the Strait of Hormuz' and the Red Sea, impacting 20% and 12% of world energy respectively. Sending 5-10,000 troops into 'impossible geography' is inadequate compared to past Gulf Wars. Regime change is the only fundamental solution but is unprepared.

5Inevitable Return to a JCPOA-like Agreement

Despite current aggressive postures, the US will likely have to return to an agreement resembling the JCPOA. Iran, having been severely damaged and destabilized, cannot afford to completely relinquish its nuclear capability, as it provides regional relevance and leverage. Achieving all US demands is 'vanishingly small.'

If you are in Iran's shoes, 'can you afford to give up that last piece? What gives you relevance in the region?' This parallels North Korea's refusal to give up its nuclear capability. 'Getting everything we want on our 15-point list [is] vanishingly small.'

Key Concepts

Patient Adversary

Describes Iran as a long-term, resilient opponent that cannot be easily shocked into submission. Its deep cultural and historical roots, combined with a consistent leadership, mean it operates on a different timeline and strategic calculus than a short-term, transactional power.

Second and Third-Order Effects

The concept that policy decisions, especially in complex geopolitical environments, have cascading and often unforeseen consequences beyond the immediate intended outcome. The Trump administration's approach to Iran is framed as having neglected these broader effects.

Statescraft vs. Transactional Leverage

Contrasts a long-term, institution-based approach to foreign policy (statescraft) with a short-term, economic-focused, and leverage-driven approach (transactional). The latter, favored by the Trump administration, is seen as effective for immediate gains but detrimental to alliances and long-term strategic stability.

Lessons

  • Prioritize rebuilding US alliances and intelligence-sharing partnerships to restore critical information access and diplomatic leverage in complex regions like the Middle East.
  • Develop comprehensive strategic plans for engaging adversaries like Iran that account for second and third-order effects, moving beyond transactional approaches to foreign policy.
  • Invest in strengthening career intelligence and diplomatic institutions, recognizing that sustained national security work relies on professional expertise beyond political appointees.
  • Communicate transparently with the American public about the strategic rationale, costs, and potential outcomes of military and diplomatic engagements, especially in prolonged conflicts.
  • Recognize that 'bombing into oblivion' is an ineffective long-term strategy against patient adversaries and that diplomatic solutions, even imperfect ones, are often necessary to manage complex geopolitical challenges.

Notable Moments

The host and guest discuss the recording time (March 30th, 3:30 PM) to emphasize the dynamic nature of the situation in Iran.

This highlights the real-time, rapidly evolving context of the geopolitical discussion, underscoring the uncertainty inherent in foreign policy analysis.

Sue Gordon describes her role as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence as being the 'career intelligence officer' in the policy room, understanding how intelligence intersects with decision-making.

This establishes her unique credibility and perspective, emphasizing the distinction between political appointees and career intelligence professionals in shaping national security policy.

Gordon uses a parenting analogy to describe the US's overwhelming power relative to other nations, stating, 'We're like parents with children. We can do incredible damage to get the compliance we want.'

This vivid analogy illustrates the immense, disproportionate power of the US but also subtly critiques its application, suggesting that 'it would be best if we left them liking us a bit.'

Gordon describes the current situation as being 'on the Titanic and there's an iceberg ahead and all we're doing is saying there's no iceberg there.'

This powerful metaphor conveys the sense of impending crisis and the perceived denial or lack of preparedness by decision-makers regarding the severe challenges ahead with Iran.

Quotes

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"The intelligence community assessed much as they did right before this war that Iran was by and large not was being constrained and not continuing to pursue the actual development of weapons."

Sue Gordon
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"It could have been an could have been an equation that they thought um that if they got us to do something was particularly difficult for our allies that that would weaken our ability to have a coalition and that would increase their position."

Sue Gordon
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"Iran is a patient adversary. They're not going away anytime soon. You're not going to be able to shock and awe them into submission. You can't ask them to be who they're not."

Sue Gordon
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"There are two chances that those two statements you just said are true are two and Slim just walked out the door. Of course, you know, of of of course those things were known."

Sue Gordon
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"The destruction of our alliances. Friends was one of the things that for my 30 years I always said distinguish us from Russia and China is that we had friends. We have fewer."

Sue Gordon

Q&A

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