Amb. Chas Freeman: Trump's China summit, Chinese strategy, and the emerging order in West Asia

The summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping achieved minimal breakthroughs, serving primarily to confirm the existing state of the US-China relationship. Both sides sought 'constructive strategic stability,' essentially agreeing to avoid war. Trump gained pageantry and a distraction from domestic issues like the Epstein files and the war with Iran. Xi gained prestige by being treated as an equal and used the opportunity to directly warn Trump about Taiwan, which he called a 'ticking time bomb.' Discussions on trade deals (aircraft, soybeans) were largely symbolic, with actual implementation uncertain.

Ambassador Freeman's initial assessment that the summit would be 'inconsequential' and yield 'small' good, later confirmed by the outcome. Specific mentions of 'constructive strategic stability' and Xi's warning about Taiwan.

Contrary to Western 'mirror imaging,' China's primary strategic goal is not to replace the United States as a global hegemon. Instead, China seeks to restore its wealth, power, and international respect, returning to its historic borders (e.g., resolving the Taiwan issue). China does not impose its ideology on other nations and maintains good relations with diverse regimes. Its focus remains largely on domestic issues like the real estate bubble, deflation, and managing its numerous ethnic minorities. China's 'face' (yanza) concept, tied to self-respect from others' esteem, drives its sensitivity to insults.

Freeman states, 'I don't believe they do [want to replace US as hegemon]. I think what they want to do is be left alone to restore their wealth and power. They want international respect.' He contrasts this with the US's current policy of not wanting China to be unified or powerful.

A significant irony in current geopolitics is that China, once an international outlaw, has become the strongest defender of the post-WWII international order based on the UN, international law, and principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Conversely, the United States, the architect of this order, has actively torn it apart by withdrawing from numerous international organizations and disregarding international law (e.g., unilateral sanctions, abandoning the JCPOA). China is now leveraging these international institutions to promote its interests and is creating new ones (e.g., AIIB, New Development Bank) where existing ones are blocked by US dominance.

Freeman notes, 'They were the opponents of the UN system. They are now the strongest defenders of the UN system. And the United States whose idea the UN system was is now opposed to it.' He cites US withdrawals from 60 international organizations and 32 UN specialized agencies.

Despite China's and the international community's opposition to nuclear proliferation, the US attack on Iran has likely made Iran's nuclearization inevitable. The principal opponent of nuclear weapons in Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is dead, and his successors do not share his opposition. The attack has destroyed the arguments of those within Iran who opposed nuclear weapons, leading to serious discussions among high-ranking officials about the necessity of a nuclear deterrent against potential Israeli attacks. The ease of building a nuclear weapon, even without testing, means Iran may have already developed one.

Freeman states, 'I think one of the main effects of this attack on Iran has been to destroy the arguments of those in Iran who were opposed to nuclear weapons. Now, Iran almost certainly will go nuclear if it hasn't done it already.' He also recounts his personal experience learning to build a bomb.

The traditional Anglo-American maritime hegemony, which ensured free passage through straits, is dissolving, with Iran setting a precedent for control over the Strait of Hormuz. In response to US actions, Gulf Arab states like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are quietly discussing a post-war order with Iran, evidenced by their banning of US air base use or overflight. China and Russia are separately proposing common, cooperative security architectures for the Persian Gulf that would exclude foreign military presence, including their own. The UAE remains an outlier, doubling down on its relationship with Israel, making it a target for Iran.

Freeman details, 'Iran has just changed that [law of the sea in Hormuz] and I don't think it's going to go back to the Anglo-American rule set.' He cites 'circumstantial evidence' of Gulf states discussing a post-war order with Iran, including banning US air base use.