Exclusive: Former American & Iranian Negotiators on Ceasefire Talks & How War Could End

Former Iranian Ambassador Mousavian asserts that Iran approaches negotiations with heightened mistrust due to past US actions. He cites the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) despite Iran's full compliance, and subsequent US military attacks following periods of significant negotiation progress in 2025 and 2026, as reasons for this skepticism.

Mousavian states, 'Iranians now they are coming to negotiation table with mistrust more than ever because once the deal was agreed in 2015 Iran was in full compliance and the US withdrew.' He then lists multiple instances of US attacks after negotiation progress (05:42).

Mousavian highlights that Iran has consistently been willing to make significant concessions regarding its nuclear program, including diluting its 60% enriched uranium, suspending enrichment for years, and achieving zero stockpile. These offers, confirmed by the Omani foreign minister, contradict the US narrative of an imminent nuclear threat.

Mousavian explains, 'in negotiation 2025 Iran said we are ready to dilute all 60% to below 5%... Iran accepted to suspend enrichment for some years. Iran accepted to have zero stockpile.' He references the Omani foreign minister's public statements (08:25).

Rob Malley criticizes the Trump administration's negotiation team, specifically Jared Kushner and Steve Woodco, for their lack of nuclear expertise. This inexperience, combined with President Trump's unpredictable and mood-driven decision-making, led to misunderstandings of Iranian positions and an inability to secure a consistent diplomatic path.

Malley states, 'Jared Kushner and Steve Woodco are not nuclear experts... they didn't have nuclear experts... they misunderstood Iranian positions. They couldn't appreciate what they were actually trying to convey.' He notes Trump's 'mercurial and unpredictable' nature (15:31).

Malley suggests that President Trump's decision to launch military action, despite significant Iranian concessions that could have been framed as 'better than Obama's deal,' was driven by a desire for a decisive 'win' and regime change, rather than a genuine pursuit of a negotiated settlement. Trump felt 'unstoppable' after perceived successes in other regions.

Malley explains that even if Iran's offer of suspension was 'better than Obama's,' Trump's goal was to 'change the regime in Iran... and that he would go down in history at this person.' (19:42).

Mousavian unequivocally states that the US naval blockade of Iranian ports, based on UN Resolution 1974, constitutes an 'act of war' and 'aggression.' This action is internationally condemned and is seen by Iran as an existential threat, prompting their use of all available cards, including threats to the Strait of Hormuz.

Mousavian declares, 'the naval blockade based on United Nation resolution 1974 is act of war is aggression. Therefore, internationally, legally, what the US is doing is a clear aggression or act of war' (21:40).

Mousavian proposes a multilateral enrichment mechanism in the Persian Gulf as a long-term solution to regional nuclear proliferation concerns. This arrangement, similar to Urenco in Europe, would involve international control by the IAEA and participation from world powers, preventing individual nations like Saudi Arabia or Egypt from developing their own enrichment capabilities.

Mousavian suggests, 'A multilateral enrichment nuclear arrangement in this region would be the best way out where it would be fully under the control of international atomic energy agency and even the US, Russia, China, the world powers they can participate' (24:51).